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5.1  Introduction 
The  notion of an adjustment assistance program for American workers 
displaced by  import competition dates back to 1945. A proposal for a 
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program was first placed on the 
national agenda in 1954 by David McDonald, head of the steelworkers’ 
union, as a member of the Randall Commission. As part of the package 
to ensure labor support for the Kennedy Round of the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, the Trade Expansion Act of  1962 established TAA for 
workers whose layoff could be  attributed  to a tariff  reduction in the 
industry. The program provided compensation and adjustment services 
to trade-displaced workers. In 1974 TAA was liberalized to cover all 
cases where imports “contributed importantly” to worker displacement. 
This liberalization  was an important factor in securing passage of  the 
Trade Act of  1974 which gave the president authority to enter into the 
Tokyo Round of  Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
In the early 1970s TAA was  described by  advocates of  free trade, 
especially members of the business and academic communities, as “an 
integral part of  U.S. trade policy.” But by  1980-81  the TAA program 
came  under  intense  criticism  for  being  expensive,  inefficient,  and 
inequitable.’ In response to these criticisms, the administration  made 
important legislative changes in the program during the budget recon- 
ciliation process in 1981. Recently, amid growing concern that protec- 
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tionist sentiment is rising and that trade policy will become a partisan 
issue, there has been renewed support for some form of trade adjustment 
assistance, although not necessarily for the current program (Bergsten 
and Cline 1982). The TAA program is due to expire in 1983, and Con- 
gress will hold hearings and may mandate further revisions then as a 
condition for maintaining some form of  trade adjustment assistance. 
In light of  the debate surrounding TAA, this paper reexamines the 
basic and frequently conflicting rationales for a categorical assistance 
program for trade-displaced workers. It attempts to quantify wherever 
possible  both  the costs and  benefits of  TAA  and discusses possible 
modifications to the current program. 
Section 5.2 discusses the equity, efficiency, and political rationales for 
government involvement in the adjustment process and compares the 
merits  of  general  and  categorical  dislocation  programs  for  trade- 
displaced workers. The section also assesses the goals of  adjustment 
policy-to  provide compensation, to facilitate expanded trade, and to 
promote  market  adjustment-and  the likely trade-offs  among  these 
goals. The entire discussion focuses only on the process of worker adjust- 
ment to economic dislocation. While firm and community adjustment are 
important aspects of  the problem of  economic dislocation, to consider 
them here would take us too far afield. 
Section 5.3 attempts to estimate the costs and benefits of TAA as it was 
amended in the Trade Act of  1974. As is the case with many social 
programs with multiple and frequently ill-defined objectives, it is easier 
to conceptually define the costs and benefits than it is to quantify them. 
Nonetheless,  the  section  provides  up-to-date  empirical  information 
which may be useful to policymakers in their evaluation of the program. 
The final section summarizes our findings and raises questions which 
should be addressed in a comprehensive review of  the program. 
5.2  Rationales for Government Intervention in the Adjustment Process 
There are three broad  and frequently interrelated  reasons for the 
government  to intervene  in  the  process  of  adjustment  to economic 
change: equity, efficiency, and political efficacy. 
5.2.1  Equity 
Rarely does an economic change (e.g., a tariff reduction, deregulation, 
a shift in tastes, a technological innovation, a change in resource endow- 
ments, etc.) benefit all members of  society. Typically, some individuals 
gain and others lose in both the long and short run. A change is poten- 
tially beneficial to society if  the gainers could potentially compensate the 
losers so that everyone affected is at least no worse off. The decision to 155  Trade Adjustment Assistance 
actually  compensate the losers depends on both  equity  and political 
considerations. 
In general, the equity basis for compensation is the widely held notion 
that, when the nation as a whole gains potentially from an economic 
change, the potential losers should be compensated for at least part of 
their losses. The magnitude of  compensation on equity grounds depends 
on a socially accepted notion of equity. For some societies, it may depend 
on the losers’ relative position on the income distribution: the relatively 
poor should have more of  their losses compensated than the relatively 
rich. For other societies, compensation on equity grounds may be strictly 
proportional to losses. 
The equity basis for compensation may speak for the need for a special 
categorical program like TAA for trade-displaced workers if  it can be 
shown that  they  differ systematically from other workers who incur 
adjustment costs from non-trade-related changes. One difference, for 
example, might  be  that trade-displaced workers  are economically or 
socially disadvantaged relative to workers who are displaced by techno- 
logical or other changes. If  the government’s goal is to improve the 
income distribution, then a case might be made for a special and more 
generous form of  compensation targeted specifically at workers in im- 
port-competing industries? 
There is almost no evidence on this point. We do know that workers in 
import-sensitive industries are generally more economically disadvan- 
taged than workers in manufacturing as a whole (Ah0 and Orr 1981). 
There may  be  some presumption,  therefore, that the average trade- 
displaced worker should have more of  his loss compensated than the 
average  manufacturing  worker  who  is  displaced  for  other  reasons. 
However, any displaced worker is likely to be a “marginal” worker and 
therefore to have different characteristics than the average worker. A 
priori, it is difficult to argue that a trade-displaced worker is any different 
than the average, say, technologically displaced worker. The main empir- 
ical evidence from a survey done by Mathematica Policy Research (Cor- 
son et al. 1979) suggests that the occupational and demographic charac- 
teristics of  TAA recipients are very similar to those of  unemployment 
insurance (UI) recipients? 
A second possible difference between  trade-displaced  workers and 
other displaced workers is that, regardless of their current position on the 
income distribution, workers in import-competing industries tend to have 
higher adjustment costs and should therefore have more of  their losses 
compensated. This seems to be less an argument for a special categorical 
program for trade-displaced workers than an argument that any com- 
pensation scheme based  on equity considerations should provide the 
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amount of  empirical evidence available suggests that TAA recipients in 
general do not have higher earnings losses than UI recipients.“  It could be 
argued that the true adjustment costs (including nonmonetary costs) are 
higher for workers in the import-competing sectors. However, it could 
also  be  argued  that  nonmonetary  losses are simply proportional  to 
monetary costs. We have no good evidence on the issue of nonmonetary 
losses. 
Another equity argument for a special categorical compensation pro- 
gram for trade-displaced workers is that they have been harmed by  a 
specific historical government policy of  promoting expanded trade and 
are therefore more deserving of  compensation than workers who have 
been displaced for reasons unrelated to government policy. The argu- 
ment would be stronger if it could be shown that trade-displaced workers 
have been hurt solely or primarily because of  government changes in 
trade restrictions or because of changes in other trade policies. This was 
the rationale for the adjustment assistance provisions of  the Trade Ex- 
pansion Act of 1962, which provided compensation for injury incurred as 
a result of  tariff reductions. 
The argument has since been extended to suggest that the absence of 
government intervention to restrict  increased imports justifies special 
compensation for trade-displaced workers. This was an implicit justifica- 
tion for the adjustment assistance provisions of  the Trade Act of  1974, 
which completely severed the connection between tariff reductions and 
compensation and instead made workers eligible for compensation if  it 
could be shown that imports had “contributed importantly” to worker 
displacement. 
Both of these arguments presuppose the existence of an implicit social 
contract between the government and workers in import-competing in- 
dustries implying that the government will compensate them for any 
losses they incur because of  trade changes. But it is very hard to distin- 
guish this from the notion of a more general implicit contract between the 
government and all workers implying that the government will compen- 
sate any worker for losses due to the failure of government to prevent any 
type  of  economic change. If  the failure of  government  to prevent  a 
change harmful to some is accepted as a valid criterion for Compensation, 
in principle all workers should be potentially eligible, and there is no 
equity basis for categorical programs. If  specific government action (as 
opposed to inaction) is accepted as a criterion for compensation, then the 
equity argument for categorical programs is somewhat stronger. 
However, it may simply be the case that voters and policymakers view 
import-related injury as inherently more “unfair” than losses caused by 
domestic factors like labor-saving technological change or competition 
from domestic producers,  even if  the occupational  and demographic 
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erations might then require a categorical and more generous compensa- 
tion and assistance program for trade-related injury. 
There is one major equity argument against any sort of  dislocation 
program, whether categorical or general. To the extent that displaced 
workers compete for jobs with new entrants and reentrants (who are 
frequently women and young people) into the labor force, an effective 
dislocation program may impose costs on new entrants in the form of 
longer duration of  job search or lower starting wages. 
5.2.2  Economic Efficiency 
The efficiency argument for government intervention in the adjust- 
ment process is that market imperfections or externalities prevent or 
impede efficient adjustment. 
Wage and Price Rigidities 
Changes in supply or demand generally cause changes in both output 
and prices. In markets in which wages and prices are slow to decline in 
response to long-term shift in supply or demand, more of  the required 
adjustment must come in the form of declines in output and employment. 
Some of  the unemployment resulting from this wage and price rigidity 
may be involuntary in the sense that workers would be willing to accept 
work at a lower wage, but are unable to find work at the prevailing (rigid) 
wage? 
The preferred response to wage and price rigidities creating involun- 
tary unemployment might be to attack the problem directly by initiating 
antitrust  action  against  monopolistic/oligopolistic price-setters. How- 
ever, this is often infeasible, either politically or because the antitrust 
mechanism is very slow, so there may be some scope for government 
intervention to aid workers. 
The efficiency argument for government intervention in the case of 
involuntary unemployment resulting from wage/price rigidities is that the 
wage inflexibility increases the duration of  search and therefore the social 
cost of  unemployment (i.e., output foregone). The government may be 
able to reduce duration by providing information on alternative employ- 
ment opportunities as well as retraining and relocation allowances. There 
is  also  a  strong equity argument  for  providing income  maintenance 
because the unemployment is involuntary. 
Labor Market Congestion 
A large-scale permanent layoff may cause some labor market conges- 
tion  (an externality) if  the local labor market  is relatively small and 
workers are relatively immobile.  This congestion means that it takes 
longer for an average displaced worker to find a job than it would in the 
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seekers  with better information about employment opportunities in other 
areas or industries and, if  need be, to provide training and relocation 
assistance to speed up the adjustment process. 
The literature on labor market congestion also suggests that it may be 
optimal to slow down the process of  adjustment by providing temporary 
and declining wage subsidies to firms undergoing pressure to adjust their 
work force when congestion in the “comparable labor market” (defined 
both in terms of geographic contiguity and comparable skill levels) delays 
the rate of transfer of  workers to other jobs (Lapan 1976, 1978; Cassing 
and Ochs 1978). Parsons (1980) distinguishes between the congestion 
effects  of  an industry’s own unemployment  rate and the congestion 
effects of the national unemployment rate. Empirically, he found that the 
industry unemployment rate seemed positively related to the rate of labor 
transfer, but that the national unemployment rate was negatively related. 
Regardless of the type of congestion, an important cause of labor market 
externality is the slow rate of adjustment of  real wages. The optimal 
dynamic wage subsidy declines as real relative wages in the industry 
undergoing adjustment decline. 
Labor Immobility 
Labor  immobility per se is not  necessarily a market imperfection 
requiring government intervention on efficiency grounds. If wages were 
flexible, workers who could not move geographically or across industries 
because of social or family ties or lack of  required skills would have the 
option of remaining employed at a lower wage. In this case, there is no 
efficiency rationale for intervention (Magee 1973). 
However, if  wages are inflexible, immobility may give rise to large- 
scale and possibly long-term unemployment.  The appropriate role of 
government policy might then be to provide adjustment services such as 
counseling and training. There may also be an equity and an efficiency 
rationale for income maintenance because the demographic and occupa- 
tional characteristics (age, race, sex, marital status, low skills, etc.) giving 
rise to geographic and occupational immobility also tend to be associated 
with economically disadvantaged groups, and because immobility causes 
the duration of  job search to increase. 
Risk,  Uncertainty, and Imperfect Capital Markets 
It is frequently argued that investment in human capital is generally 
more risky than investment in physical capital because owners of human 
capital do not have access to capital markets allowing them to diversify 
their assets and otherwise reduce the risk of a decline in demand for their 
services. It is true, however, that workers may be able to reduce the risk 
of layoff or income losses through judicious selection of certain skills and 
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1981). It is also true that the current tax laws allow workers to depreciate 
most of  the cost of  their investment in human capital at the time they 
make the investment, whereas owners of physical capital must depreciate 
it over a longer period!  Nevertheless, it can be argued that, in the absence 
of any program to subsidize education and training and in the absence of 
an unemployment insurance system, workers will tend to underinvest in 
human capital. 
The role of  government policy toward capital market imperfections 
might be to  provide loans for training and education (and living expenses 
while in training). In some cases the government may be able to provide 
an unemployment insurance scheme more efficiently than either private 
insurance companies or what  would result  from bargaining between 
workers and their employers over unemployment benefits and job secu- 
rity provisions.  The argument for government  insurance rests on the 
notion that a very large insurer like the government could pool risk and 
provide insurance at lower cost. This is not to deny the important role of 
collective bargaining between management and labor in providing insur- 
ance and job security. However, government may be required to supple- 
ment this, especially when firms possess monopsony power. 
It might also be argued that the government could improve the in- 
formation  available  to workers seeking to acquire human  capital  by 
providing  estimates of  the long-term demand for various skills. The 
Bureau of  Labor Statistics and the Employment Service currently pro- 
vide considerable information of  this sort. 
None of  the preceding discussion about the efficiency rationales for 
government intervention provides much presumption in favor of a cate- 
gorical program for trade-displaced workers over a more general pro- 
gram for all dislocated workers. As in the case of the equity arguments for 
TAA, the efficiency basis  for  a special program  for  trade-displaced 
workers must rest on the fact that they are different from most other 
workers who lose their jobs. Specifically, it must be shown that the 
occupational  and  demographic characteristics  of  workers in  import- 
competing industries (or the characteristics of  import-competing indus- 
tries) are such that trade-displaced workers require special assistance. 
It could be argued that many of  the same characteristics of  trade- 
displaced workers that may give rise to an equity basis for special com- 
pensation may also give rise to an efficiency rationale for special adjust- 
ment services. The same caveat to the discussion of the equity argument 
applies here:  we  do not  know for certain that the occupational  and 
demographic characteristics of  trade-displaced workers are significantly 
different than those of workers displaced for other reasons. 
If  trade-displaced workers could be shown to have less occupational or 
geographic mobility or to face more risk or uncertainty of  displacement 
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of  special adjustment services and unemployment insurance for them. 
Both Aho and Orr (1981) and Mathematica have shown that the worker 
populations in import-sensitive industries tend to have slightly higher 
proportions of women and older workers than the manufacturing aver- 
age. These are precisely the groups who tend to face sociological or 
human capital barriers to mobility. However, there is little evidence that 
TAA recipients on average experience significantly higher earnings los- 
ses than UI recipients, so it is difficult to argue for special assistance on 
either equity or efficiency grounds. 
The risk and uncertainty factor has never really been investigated. 
Shifts in trade are possibly less predictable than shift, for example, in 
tastes or technology. If  so, an argument could be made in favor of special 
government insurance programs to reduce the adjustment problems of 
workers in certain traded goods industries if  these industries are subsi- 
dized abroad or if  they are considered important for national security or 
prestige. 
5.2.3  Political Efficacy 
The political argument for government intervention is really the best 
argument for categorical programs to supplement a more general, and 
less generous, dislocation program. The political argument is that certain 
interest groups have sufficient political power to block or delay socially 
beneficial changes unless they are generously compensated and otherwise 
assisted. The case for a special program like TAA for trade-displaced 
workers is that the alternative to TAA is increased trade barriers or 
greater difficulty in reducing existing trade restrictions because of  the 
political power of  the potential “losers. ” 
The past and potential political benefits of  TAA are substantial. It is 
generally accepted that the adjustment assistance provisions of  both the 
1962 and 1974  trade acts were important in obtaining legislative authority 
for and muting workers’ opposition to the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds of 
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) (Frank 1977). Of course, it is 
impossible to know whether the MTN would have been approved by 
Congress in its present form in the absence of TAA. It is also impossible 
to know how much the current TAA program has reduced the incidence 
and severity of  protectionism. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that the TAA program does serve to 
reduce protectionism. The amount of  political pressure (e.g., campaign 
contributions  and votes) that  potential  losers  are likely to exert  on 
Congress and the executive branch is probably an increasing function of 
their expected losses. Since studies of  the TAA program (Corson et al. 
1979; Richardson 1982a; Jacobson 1980) have shown that it provides 
fairly generous compensation for earnings losses, it is likely that the 
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expected losses. Beyond this, the program also serves to provide policy- 
makers with a more palatable alternative to either increased trade bar- 
riers or no response at all to demands by their constituents for assistance. 
Further, a well-publicized and fairly generous compensation program 
may  reduce  public  sympathy for protectionist  demands.  Richardson 
(1979) cites evidence from political polls suggesting that voters are, in 
fact, less sympathetic to demands for import protection if  there is an 
alternative way to compensate and assist those injured by import com- 
petition. In general, TAA theoretically serves to reduce both the supply 
and the demand for trade restrictions in the political market for protec- 
tion. 
However, there may be an important exception to the proposition that 
TAA reduces workers’ demands for protection. Ethier (1982) has de- 
veloped a cyclical model of  dumping in which the existence of  TAA 
actually induces foreign dumping and increases domestic employment 
variability. He  suggests that “if the presence of dumping has the political 
effect of  generating protectionist sentiment, the addition of  TAA will 
increase  such sentiment-just  the opposite of  its political intent, and 
contrary to general belief.” This conclusion seems to rest on the assump- 
tion that it is the existence per se of dumping that generates demands for 
protection. Dumping provides a political focal point around which to 
mobilize workers and the public in support of trade restrictions. If TAA 
increases the magnitude of dumping and the number of workers affected, 
it should also stimulate greater protectionist sentiment. 
Two factors may tend to offset this. The first is that the level of TAA 
compensation, while it affects the magnitude of dumping and layoffs, also 
affects an individual worker’s net income loss due to dumping, which is 
probably also a determinant of the demand for protection. The net effect 
of TAA  on the demand for protection would seem to depend on whether 
the greater political visibility of  dumping, combined with  the larger 
number of workers affected, is offset by the lower, private individual cost 
of  unemployment. 
The second possible offsetting factor is the manner in which TAA is 
financed. In Ethier’s model, TAA is not financed by  experience-rated 
taxes on firms (as is UI), but rather out of  general revenues. In these 
circumstances, TAA would tend to encourage layoffs (and dumping). 
Experience-rated taxes on employers would tend to reduce layoffs and 
(assuming the tax is not shifted back onto employees) this would reduce 
workers’ (but not employers’) support for protectionist policies. In fact, 
the current TAA  program is not experience rated, and as we discuss later, 
there is empirical evidence that TAA encourages temporary layoffs. 
Even without the prospect of  new multilateral trade negotiations, a 
strong political case still can be made for continuing a special program for 
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politically more effective than other workers. There are several charac- 
teristics of  the import-competing sectors contributing  to the political 
effectiveness of trade-displaced workers. Proponents of trade restrictions 
have fewer free-rider and organizational problems than opponents both 
because the benefits of  protection are relatively concentrated and the 
costs are diffuse, and because the industries themselves are more heavily 
unionized and have higher firm concentration ratios. A large number of 
states are potentially affected by imports, with a large number of congres- 
sional and electoral votes at stake (Bayard and Orr 1982; Baldwin 1982; 
Wolf 1979). Firms and workers injured by imports may be able to exert 
more effective political pressure for protection than those harmed by 
forces identifiable as domestic in origin, such as internal demand shifts or 
technological changes. This could be the case if voters and policymakers 
considered foreign competition more unfair than domestic competition, 
or if there are fewer effective countervailing political pressures when the 
source of injury is foreign rather than domestic. 
The case for a categorical program also rests on the proposition that 
trade is becoming increasingly important to the United States and that 
conflicts over trade policy, both among domestic actors and between the 
United States and its trading partners, are likely to intensify over time 
(Ah0 and Bayard 1983). 
A number of major sources of potential conflict over trade are on the 
horizon:  the rapid growth of  exports of  manufactures from the newly 
industrialized  countries; possible negotiations between the developed 
and developing countries to assure market access and to integrate the 
developing countries more fully into the trading system; the active indus- 
trial policies practiced in many industrial countries to develop specific 
sectors (particularly high technology industries); and continued conflict 
with Japan over market access (Blackhurst, Marian, and Tumlir, 1978). 
In addition, proponents of  export promotion should also recognize that 
one cannot promote exports without also increasing imports, thereby 
provoking protectionist demands at home. 
The medium-term outlook for growth and employment is bleak, and 
most countries are under significant political pressure to reduce unem- 
ployment. The combination of  slow growth and painful but necessary 
adjustments to changes in the structure of comparative advantage is likely 
to generate protectionist pressures. 
The basic political rationale for TAA  is to reduce opposition to  policies 
promoting expanded trade and to provide an alternative to protection- 
ism. The demand for programs to promote expanded trade, as well as 
opposition to these  policies, is likely to increase  in the future.  The 
political basis for TAA is likely to grow correspondingly stronger over 
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5.2.4  The Goals of  an Adjustment Assistance Program 
Three major goals of a categorical adjustment assistance program are: 
to provide compensation, to facilitate expanded trade, and to promote 
market adjustment. In this section we  explore some of  the problems 
involved in determining the appropriate mixture of  compensation and 
adjustment provisions and some of  the conflicts and trade-offs between 
the goals. 
Both  equity  and  political  considerations  may  dictate  that  trade- 
displaced workers should receive special, and presumably more gener- 
ous, compensation than workers who are displaced for reasons other than 
changes in trade. Examined separately, the equity, efficiency, and politi- 
cal criteria may suggest entirely different magnitudes of compensation. 
The equity rationale for compensation might suggest that the government 
should calculate the earnings and benefit losses (and, if  possible, all the 
other nonmonetary costs of  unemployment) and set the compensation 
level proportional to these losses. The political basis for compensation 
does not lend itself to such an easy calculation. If  the policy objective is to 
reduce  political  pressures that  can  block  or delay  socially desirable 
changes, then the relative political power of  the potential losers, rather 
than their losses per se or their position on the income distribution, 
determines the magnitude of their compensation. The amount of feasible 
compensation is clearly somewhere between  nothing and the present 
value of  the gains that would accrue to society if  the change occurs. 
Beyond  this,  it  is  a  political  decision  to determine  whether  trade- 
displaced workers should be compensated for part of, all of, or more than 
their losses. 
In some import-sensitive industries, workers may earn oligopolistic 
rents or returns from the past structure of protection. On equity grounds, 
it seems unfair to compensate displaced workers for the loss of  these 
particular  rents. However, the same industry characteristics allowing 
firms and workers to collect these sorts of rents may also be contributing 
to their  political  power  to influence trade  restrictions.  On political 
grounds, therefore, it may be necessary to compensate workers for losses 
of these returns. The efficiency implications of compensating workers for 
oligopolistic/oligopsonistic  or protectionist rent losses are entirely neg- 
ative. Compensation could create problems of  moral hazard-workers 
might be induced to enter or to stay in an industry in which the risk of the 
loss of  these rents was reduced  by  a generous compensation scheme. 
Compensation of  these losses would tend to slow the rate of  adjustment 
to changes in trade and reduce the social gains from adjustment. 
The efficiency rationale for compensation is that it allows workers to 
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Compensation  is tied to duration of unemployment, there is an increase in 
duration which may or may not be socially desirable. On the one hand, 
increased duration may improve the quality of the match between work- 
ers and job opportunities (and hence, increase earnings). On the other 
hand, compensation reduces the incentives to accept a job quickly and 
may result in excessive duration. The socially efficient compensation 
scheme would provide benefits up to the point where the marginal social 
gain to higher earnings was equal to the marginal social loss due to longer 
unemployment duration. It is easy to conceive of circumstances in which 
the socially efficient compensation differs from (i.e. , is probably  less 
than) compensation based on equity or political considerations. 
There may be several trade-offs between compensation in the form of 
cash payments and compensation in the form of adjustment services. The 
workers' losses are caused by the initial spell of unemployment and the 
subsequent losses in lifetime  earnings because of  the loss of  human 
capital. But both of  these are in part determined by the availability of 
adjustment  services. If  government-provided  adjustment services are 
effective in assisting workers to acquire new jobs and skills more rapidly 
than they would in the absence of  the government adjustment services, 
then the amount of cash compensation required is reduced. To determine 
the  appropriate mix  of  cash payments and  adjustment  services, the 
government needs considerable information about the efficacy and re- 
turns to training, relocation, counseling, and other adjustment services 
for various types of  workers. 
In all of  this, an implicit assumption has been that trade-displaced 
workers are for the most part likely to be permanently displaced. The 
results of the Mathematica survey (Corson et al. 1979) suggest that most 
TAA recipients have been on temporary layoff and have returned to their 
old industry, and sometimes to their old job with their old firm.'  Other 
studies (see table 5.2) found that a higher proportion of  displaced work- 
ers actually changed jobs or employers. Differences in the incidence of 
permanent displacement could be the result  of  a number of  factors, 
including differences in worker eligibility criteria and differences in the 
stage of  the business cycle when layoffs occurred. 
In the case of temporary displacements, there is no efficiency basis for 
either compensation or adjustment services. (Uncertainty over whether 
displacement is temporary or permanent might provide a basis for some 
adjustment services and compensation on efficiency grounds.) Both the 
equity and the political criteria could suggest the need for some com- 
pensation for temporary displacements but would not indicate any need 
for adjustment services. 
It could be argued that if firms and workers were fully informed that the 
industry is periodically subject to temporary trade-related displacements, 
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bargaining process would have already compensated workers for the risk 
of  temporary displacement.  On the other hand, there may  still be a 
political basis for “compensation” for even temporarily displaced work- 
ers in the traded goods sector if  these workers could otherwise block the 
increase in imports. The level of  compensation could be fairly small 
because the intensity of  their lobbying effort is likely to be small, given 
the fact that the wage structure may already reflect the risk of temporary 
layoff or reduced hours. 
The discussion thus far has provided an overview of the rationales for 
trade adjustment  assistance.  Given that a TAA program has several 
potentially  conflicting goals-to  compensate the  “losers”  for  equity 
reasons, to buy out those who could impede socially beneficial changes, 
and to promote efficient labor market adjustment-it  is probably not 
surprising  that  the current program has attracted  so much criticism. 
Different critics may wish to structure the program to emphasize one 
specific goal, but any change in program emphasis is likely to evoke 
criticism for neglecting the  other goals.  Any  attempt to change the 
current program emphasis must be based on some sort of  codbenefit 
calculus. In what follows we attempt to make these calculations, although 
many of  the costs and benefits are obviously difficult to quantify. 
5.3  Estimating the Costs and Benefits of  TAA 
5.3.1  Conceptual Overview 
As is the case for many social programs with multiple and frequently 
ill-defined objectives, it is easier to conceptually define the appropriate 
costs and benefits than it is to quantify them. It is doubtful that the 
drafters of  the TAA legislation in the Trade Act of  1974 were able to 
make any calculation of the potential costs and benefits of  the program. 
This is not surprising, given the relatively small scope of  the 1962 TAA 
program and the limited empirical research  on adjustment  assistance 
available at the time.8 However, in the last ten years the Labor Depart- 
ment has funded several important studies of  both the 1962 and 1974 
TAA programs as well as extensive research in the broad area of measur- 
ing the costs of worker displacement. In this section we first review the 
major conceptual problems involved in evaluating the costs and benefits 
of  adjustment assistance, and then we draw on the empirical evidence to 
assess the TAA program. 
Potential Benefits 
The political benefits of adjustment assistance are the social gains from 
liberalized trade, or a reduction in the incidence and severity of protec- 
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trade negotiations, as in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds of  the MTN; 
from unilateral reductions in tariff barriers, as in the U.S.  generalized 
system of  tariff preferences for developing countries (GSP); or from the 
avoidance of new trade barriers) are the reduction (or avoidance) of price 
distortions causing inefficiencies in consumption and in the allocation of 
resources between the export, import-competing, and nontraded goods 
sectors of  the domestic economy. 
As we show later, the annual social (as distinct from  private) gains from 
marginally freer trade are fairly small? It is necessary to emphasize the 
marginal  nature of  these  calculations  because  even  the most  ardent 
proponents of  TAA have never  suggested that it can be used to buy 
once-and-for-all elimination  of  all trade barriers or to prevent any in- 
crease in existing restrictions. However, it is also important to point out 
that the gains from freer trade are annual ones and that, even when they 
are heavily discounted, the cumulative social gain can be quite large. 
Within the context of  the political implications of a TAA  program are 
several other potential benefits, none of which is easily quantified. Gold- 
farb and Cordes (1979,1980) have suggested that one potential benefit of 
any scheme compensating individuals for losses resulting from govern- 
ment action (but not necessarily inaction) is that it fosters the notion that 
the government is “fair”  and unarbitrary  in its decision  making. The 
Trade Act of  1962, for example, provided compensation for workers hurt 
by  government  action-tariff  reductions;  the  Trade  Act  of  1974 
broadened eligibility for compensation to include injury caused by gov- 
ernment inaction-failure  to prevent an increase in imports. 
An adjustment assistance program, regardless of  its domestic equity 
and efficiency implications, may generate significant foreign policy gains. 
To the extent that it reduces the use of  trade restrictions, TAA  promotes 
expanded trade and a more efficient allocation of resources worldwide. 
Indeed, the OECD secretariat  (1979) has urged  the use of  “positive 
adjustment” programs as a substitute for protectionist policies that in- 
hibit the growth of world trade. Maintaining and expanding the liberal 
world trading system is a major goal of  U.S. foreign policy. By demon- 
strating strong U.S. commitment to adjustment rather than protection, 
the TAA  program may encourage a similar commitment to free trade in 
other countries. 
This demonstration effect may be particularly important for the de- 
veloping countries. They are acutely aware of the need for adjustment 
assistance programs in the developed countries as an alternative to pro- 
tectionism. At the fifth session of  the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development  (UNCTAD 1979), the Group of  77 argued 
strongly in favor of  adjustment programs. By promoting a reduction in 
developed country trade barriers, an adjustment assistance program both 
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encourage the developing countries to accept the legitimacy of the princi- 
ple of  free trade. 
All of  these “political gains” from TAA are based on the assumption 
that it really buys freer trade by reducing political demands for protec- 
tion. This is probably unprovable, but we believe that the theoretical 
arguments presented earlier support the proposition. If  TAA is effective 
in reducing both the demand and the supply of protectionism, there may 
be additional social gains in the form of reductions in the use of produc- 
tive resources to lobby for and against trade liberalization and also in the 
use of  resources needed to administer trade restrictions. However, it may 
be that resources not spent on lobbying or administering trade barriers 
simply will be diverted to equally unproductive activities elsewhere. 
The time dimension is particularly important in any discussion of  the 
potential efficiency gains of  adjustment assistance. While the benefits of 
freer trade occur over an indefinite period of  time, the social cost is 
incurred in the relatively short run. The social cost of trade liberalization 
is the value of  output foregone when resources are involuntarily unem- 
ployed during the period of adjustment. The involuntary nature of unem- 
ployment  is important to emphasize. It is only to the extent that un- 
employment is  the result  of  market  distortions  (like wage and price 
rigidities,  labor market congestion, imperfections in the markets for 
information and capital, etc.) that there is any social gain from govern- 
ment intervention in the adjustment process. Clearly, even if  wages and 
prices were perfectly flexible, there would be some unemployment in the 
import-competing sector as workers voluntarily become unemployed in 
order to search for their best alternative employment. This sort of unem- 
ployment should not be counted as a social cost because, if  search is 
rational, workers seek alternative employment until the marginal income 
gains of finding a better job are  equal to the marginal income foregone by 
continuing to search. 
The efficiency gain from TAA then is the value of  output gained by 
reducing involuntary unemployment caused by existing market imperfec- 
tions. Although it seems callous to some, the value of  leisure ideally 
should be subtracted from the output cost of involuntary displacement. In 
practice (e.g., Bale 1976) the social costs of unemployment, and thus the 
benefits of  reducing it, are usually calculated as the total duration of 
unemployment  times  the pretax  wage in  the next-best  employment. 
These calculations tend to overstate the potential gains from promoting 
more efficient adjustment by counting all the duration as involuntary and 
by failing to value leisure.” 
Richardson  (1982b)  has  suggested  that  TAA  also  may  facilitate 
efficient adjustment if it provides workers, firms, and investors in import- 
competing  sectors  with  an  additional  “diagnostic  signal,”  both  in- 
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signals created  by  trade  distortions.  If  TAA correctly  encourages a 
leading or anticipatory adjustment to expected changes in firms’ competi- 
tiveness,  it  will  tend  to reduce  the  duration  of  unemployment  and 
perhaps also the possibility of labor market congestion which can happen 
when all of  the adjustments occur in a fairly short period. For TAA to 
play a positive role in promoting adjustment, it must be interpreted as an 
accurate harbinger of longer-run secular changes. If  it is used or  viewed as 
income maintenance to help workers endure relatively short-run or cy- 
clical fluctuations, it is unlikely to serve a useful adjustment function. 
The equity gains from TAA are the most difficult to quantify because 
they rest on a socially accepted definition of  equity. Although it may be 
possible to infer a social welfare function from the government’s treat- 
ment of various income and social groups and then to compare the actual 
treatment of  TA recipients by  income and social class with “predicted 
treatment,” we do not attempt this. Rather, in what follows we simply 
present data on TAA recipients’ characteristics and adjustment experi- 
ences and allow readers to draw their own conclusions about the equity of 
the program. 
Potential Costs 
Most of  the costs of an adjustment assistance program fall under the 
heading of  efficiency losses caused by  distorting market incentives to 
adjust to freer trade. The potential problem with any program attempting 
to compensate displaced workers is that it will simultaneously serve as a 
disincentive to adjustment. 
Attempting to compensate workers by tying compensation to the dura- 
tion of unemployment may lead to an increase in unproductive search by 
lowering the cost of  searching. We show below that many of  the recent 
TAA recipients were on temporary layoff. The high benefit levels and 
extended potential duration of benefits (52-78  weeks for TAA vs. 26-39 
weeks for UI recipients) may encourage workers to simply await recall 
rather than  engage  in  any  search.  In cases where workers correctly 
anticipate that layoffs are temporary, it may not be privately or socially 
productive to engage in job search. However, in cases where layoffs are 
actually permanent or very long-term and expectations of temporary and 
short-term displacement are incorrect,  high  TAA payments and  ex- 
tended availability may impede adjustment. 
In contrast to U1 payments, which are financed by taxing firms based 
on their layoff behavior, TAA payments are not experience rated. This 
leads to several possible implications for firm behavior. On the one hand, 
TAA may serve as a subsidy if  firms and workers incorporate expected 
TAA payments into their wage bargains. If  workers negotiate a wage 
package including payments in the event of  layoff and the existence of 
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benefits or to lower wages, the firm’s labor costs are lower by the amount 
of expected TAA. This in turn allows import-competing firms to produce 
a higher level of output or earn higher profits and encourages both capital 
and labor  to remain  in  import-competing firms when they should be 
transferred to other sectors where the social value of  output is higher. 
On the other hand, it is possible that TAA benefits are not reflected in 
either lower wages or benefits.  Even  if  workers  captured  all of  the 
benefits of  TAA and firms were not  able to lower wages or benefits 
directly as a result of TAA, it could still serve to reduce total labor costs 
and hence raise profits. To the extent that firms hoard labor through the 
business cycle or in response to short-run shocks, TAA  facilitates worker 
attachment to firms by  reducing incentives to look for a new job and 
therefore reduces the optimal amount of  labor hoarding and the firm’s 
labor cost and encourages temporary layoffs. For our purposes, what 
matters is  that, because  it is a subsidy, TAA may  reduce  firms’ and 
workers’ incentives to adjust to a long-run change in comparative advan- 
tage if it simply allows firms that are otherwise uncompetitive to stay alive 
longer, or if  it simply encourages workers to linger longer waiting for 
recall.” 
Although TAA payments are transfers from taxpayers to workers and 
therefore are not social costs per se, the program’s administrative costs 
and the efficiency costs of  using the tax system to raise revenue to fund 
TAA  payments are legitimate social costs.‘*  In the next section, we report 
TAA’s administrative  costs, but  no attempt is made to quantify the 
disincentive costs of  raising funds to finance TAA. 
5.3.2  Quantifying Costs and Benefits 
To facilitate an evaluation of  the TAA program, tables 5.1 and 5.2 
present  data from the major  studies on the occupational and demo- 
graphic characteristics and adjustment experiences of  TAA recipients. 
The data summarize  the  results  of  these  studies, but  the  reader  is 
cautioned not to make explicit comparisons between various studies. In 
many cases the data are noncomparable because they pertain either to 
the  1962 or  1974 TAA programs  and therefore  were  based on very 
different  worker  eligibility criteria.  One major  result emerging from 
these studies is that the adjustment process differs quite dramatically 
both across industries and occupational and demographic groups and 
across the stages of  the business cycle. One of  the major problems, 
therefore, in designing TAA studies is the selection of  appropriate con- 
trol groups. It is possible to make explicit comparisons between, say, UI 
and TAA  recipients in the Mathematica (Corson et al. 1979)  or Neumann 
and Glyde (1978) studies because attempts were made to select appropri- 
ate controls, but it is not appropriate to explicitly compare, say, McCar- 
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different populations, drawn at different times, and affected by different 
phases of the business cycle. 
Table 5.1 shows the occupational and demographic characteristics of 
TAA recipients under both the 1962 act (Bale 1973; McCarthy 1974; and 
Neumann and Glyde 1978) and the 1974 act (Corson et al. 1979) and also 
of  workers in industries that  have lost job opportunities because  of 
imports between 1965 and 1975 (Ah0 and Orr 1981). Table 5.2 presents 
data on the adjustment experiences of trade-displaced workers under the 
two programs. 
As discussed briefly in section 5.1, the studies offer very little support 
for the notion that, in general, trade-displaced workers are very different 
from other displaced workers. What can be said is that they consistently 
appear to be somewhat older, have longer firm tenure, and are more 
heavily unionized. Based on these characteristics, human capital theory 
would predict somewhat higher earnings losses for trade-displaced work- 
ers than for others. However, the fact the TAA recipients also appear to 
be somewhat less educated and less skilled than other workers would 
tend to imply lower losses. 
The evidence in table 5.2 suggests that permanently displaced TAA 
recipients may have more adjustment problems than other permanently 
displaced workers.  Neumann and Glyde’s sample of  TAA recipients 
under the 1962 act was almost all permanent displacements. They found 
that they tended to have significantly longer initial unemployment dura- 
tion and larger initial wage losses than the UI control group. Similar 
results emerge from the Mathematica survey of TAA  recipients under the 
1974 act. TAA recipients who changed jobs had an initial spell of almost 
42  weeks, compared to 33 weeks for UI recipients.  Permanently dis- 
placed TAA beneficiaries also tended to have larger initial wage losses 
than the UI job changers.  Overall, Mathematica estimated that the 
earnings losses for TAA  job changers were somewhat higher than for the 
UI control group, although the difference was not very ~ignificant.’~ 
However, only a small fraction of  TAA recipients (28 percent) in the 
Mathematica  sample  actually  changed  jobs  (vs.  42  percent  of  UI). 
Moreover, Mathematica found that most TAA recipients expected their 
layoff to be temporary (81 percent of TAA vs. 73 percent of  UI). This 
may help to account for the relatively small fraction of  TAA recipients 
who received training or counseling. Overall, comparing the entire TAA 
sample to the UI sample, TAA recipients did not have significantly 
higher earnings losses than UI recipients. 
These results stimulated the press and policymakers to question the 
overall equity of the TAA  program. While the results do tend to support 
the notion that permanently  trade-displaced  workers have  somewhat 
greater adjustment costs than job changers in the UI control group, the 
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at least for the sample period (prior to 1979). (Since 1979 a large number 
of  auto workers have received TAA and a significant fraction of  them 
may be permanently displaced.) Even this generalization is too broad. As 
table 5.3 shows, the earnings loss estimates in the Mathematica survey 
vary greatly across industries. For example, permanently displaced auto 
workers lost $8,000-12,000, while permanently displaced apparel work- 
ers lost roughly $6,000. At the same time, temporary displacements in 
some industries tended  to be  “overcompensated”  for their  earnings 
losses. 
Overall the results of the Mathematica survey suggest that TAA reci- 
pients, whether permanently or temporarily displaced, tend to have a 
higher proportion of  their losses compensated than the appropriate UI 
control group. The TAA  population does not appear to be very different 
from the control group in terms of either occupational and demographic 
characteristics or adjustment costs. It is correspondingly difficult to jus- 
tify a categorical program for trade-displaced workers solely on equity 
grounds. 
AIthough it is very difficult to quantify the efficiency implications of the 
TAA program, the results of the Mathematica survey do not support the 
notion that TAA has encouraged much labor market adjustment. As 
table 5.2 shows, only a small fraction of TAA  recipients actually changed 
jobs. Most workers returned to their old employer and frequently to their 
former job. By the time they were interviewed, Mathematica found that 
16 percent of TAA recipients had left their industry and 25 percent had 
changed occupations (vs. 31 percent and 39 percent of  the UI control 
group). Correspondingly, very few TAA recipients utilized the adjust- 
ment  provisions  of  the program.  Only 6 percent  of  TAA recipients 
received training versus 12 percent of  the UI group.’4 
There is evidence from both the Neumann and Glyde and the Mathe- 
matica surveys that the higher wage replacement ratio for TAA  recipients 
has lead  to longer duration  of  unemployment.  Neumann  and Glyde 
found that a ten percentage point increase in the gross (pretax) wage 
replacement ratio induced a 3-3.5  week increase in unemployment dura- 
tion. This estimate is very large relative to studies of UI recipients, where 
the normal range of  estimates is between .5  and 1.0 weeks per ten-point 
increase in the replacement ratio. Mathematica’s estimate of the impact 
of  a ten-point increase in the net (posttax) wage replacement ratio was 
roughly 1.8  weeks for TAA recipients. 
Thus far no one has been able to explain satisfactorily the high esti- 
mates of  the impact of  changes in wage replacement  ratios for TAA 
recipients relative to UI recipients. One possible explanation is that, 
since the TAA component of  the wage replacement ratio is not experi- 
ence rated, firms may use TAA to finance temporary layoffs. As dis- 
cussed earlier, TAA may encourage temporary layoffs by reducing the Table 5.1  Occupational and Demographic Characteristics of  Trade-Sensitive  Workers 
1962 TAA Program  1974 TAA Program 
Bale"  McCarthyb  Neumann/Glydec  Mathematicad  Aho/Orr" 
TAA  TAA  TAA  UI  TAA  UI  Import-  Manufacturing 
































































































51  71  57.6  64.3  61.5  64.5  48.9  70.6 
49  29  42.4  35.7  38,5  35.5  41.1  29.4 
Union (%)  NA  NA  78.5  43.5  81.3  65.8  51.3  49.0 
Job tenure 
mean (years)  10.6  13  17.7  5.6  11.8  7.8  NA  NA 
income below the 
poverty level (%)  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.9  3.7  9.8  7.0 




“Malcolm Bale, “Adjustment to Freer Trade: An Analysis of  the Adjustment Assistance Provisions of  the Trade Act of  1962,” report prepared under 
contract from the U.S. Department of Labor, 1973. 
bJames McCarthy, “Trade Adjustment Assistance: A Case Study of the Shoe Industry in Massachusetts,” report prepared under contract from the U.S. 
Department of  Labor, 1974. 
‘George Neumann and Gerald Glyde, “The Labor Market Consequences of  Trade Displacement: Evidence from the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
Program of  1962,” report prepared under contract from the U.S. Department of  Labor, 1978. 
dWalter Corson, et al., “Final Report: Survey of Trade Adjustment Assistance Recipients” report prepared by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., under 
contract from the Office of  Foreign Economic Research, U.S. Department of  Labor, 1979. 
“C. M. Aho and J. Orr, “Trade Sensitive Employment: Who Are the Affected Workers?” Monthly Labor Review, (Feb. 1981): 29-35. Table 5.2  Adjustment Experiences of TAA Recipients 
~~~~  ~  ~ 
1974 TAA Program 
1962 TAA Program  Mathematica 
Bale  McCarthy  Neumann/Glyde  TAA  UI 
TAA  TAA  TAA  UI  New Job  Old Job  All  New Job  Old Job  All 
1. Duration of  first spell of 
2.  Workers who changed  virtually 
3.  Average weekly wage 
4.  Average weekly wage on 
5.  Average hourly wage 
6. Average hourly wage on 
unemployment (weeks)  31  18.2  48.7  33.3  41.8  11.4  21.9  32.8  16.3  21.9 
employers (%)  NA  all  71.9  57.4 
before layoff ($)  NA  100.40  140.90  132.80  206  228  223  190  198  195 
first job after layoff ($)  NA  92.64  99.3  109.4  152  249  225  159  219  193 
before layoff  ($)  3.02  NA  3.40  3.30  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
first job after layoff ($)  2.68  NA  2.50  2.86  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
42  -  -  -  -  28 7. Change in average 
8. Change in average 
weekly wage (%)  NA 
hourly wage (%)  -  11 
9. Average  3,370- 
earning loss ($)  11,689 
10.  Total compensation ($)  2,059 
TAA  NA 
UI  NA 
11. Compensation 
12. Net loss ($)  1,300- 
13. Ratio of  weekly TAA and 
UI to pre-layoff weekly 
wage (%)  NA 
rate (1019) (%)  61.1-17.6 
(9-10)  9,600 
14. Received training (%)  3.8 
























-  17.6  -  26.2  +9.2  +1.0 
-  13.2  NA  NA  NA 
(12,200-  (1,900-  (3,900- 
NA  12,900)  3,300)  5,200) 
NA  5,400  2,900  3,300 
NA  2,100  1,100  1,300 
NA  3,300  1,800  2,000 
NA  (44-42)  152-88  (85-64) 
(6,800-  (-1,000  (600- 
NA  7,500)  to 400)  900) 
51.6  NA  NA  .61 
1.7  7  NA  6.4 
4.3  39  NA  5.4 
-16.3  +10.6  -  1.0 
NA  NA 
(9,800-  (1,700- 
11,000)  3,200) 
2,600  1,900 
2,600  1,900 
-  - 
(27-24)  (11  1-60) 
(7,20&  (-200  to 
8,400)  1,300) 
NA  NA 
NA  NA 













SOURCES:  See table 5.1. Table 5.3  Mean Present Discounted Value of After-Tax Earnings Losses, UI and TAA Benefits, and Net Losses by Industry and Recall 
Status, TAA Sample (in dollars) 
Automobile  Steel  Other Dutiables  Footwear  Apparel 
Never  Ever  Never  Ever  Never  Ever  Never  Ever  Never  Ever 
Re-  Re-  Re-  Re-  Re-  Re-  Re-  Re-  Re-  Re- 




earnings  15,200  2,400  3,600  13,600  2,400  3,100  17,500  0  2,700  10,300  3,700  9,200  10,800  2,100  4,400 
earnings"  19,100  6,400  7,600  17,600  5,300  6,000  18,500  700  3,400  9,900  3,400  8,800  10,800  2,100  4,400 
UI  4,800  2,400  2,600  2,300  2,300  2,300  4,500  1,200  1,700  2,800  2,900  2,800  2,900  800  1,400 





earnings  8,000  -1,600  -600  7,100  -1,100  -600  10,600  -1,600  200  6,200  -200  5,200  5,600  400  1,800 
earnings"  12,000  2,400  3,300  11,000  1,700  2,300  11,600  -900  1,000  5,900  -500  4,800  5,600  400  1,800 
Sample size  17  160  177  8  132  140  15  84  99  30  6  36  55  149  204 
SOURCE:  Walter Corson, et al., "First Report: Survey of  Trade Adjustment Assistance Recipients, report prepared by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., 
under contract from the Office of  Foreign Economic Research, U.S. Department of  Labor, 1979. 
"Adjusted by industry for changes in mean weekly earnings and for the effect of  increased job experience. 
bThe net loss equals the earnings loss minus UI and TAA benefits. It excludes supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) received by some workers. 
These benefits were received by 81 percent of  the automobile workers, 65 percent of  the steel workers, and 26 percent of  workers in others durables. 
Workers who received SUB received an average of  $1,200 and paid back an average of  $590 to the SUB funds after receipt of TAA. Workers in the steel 
industry were not required to return portions of  their SUB payments, while most automobile (85 percent) and other durable goods workers (60 percent) did. 177  Trade Adjustment Assistance 
firms’ need to hoard labor during cyclical and seasonal changes in output 
because TAA benefits increase worker attachment to the firm. Prelimi- 
nary results from a study by Utgoff (1982) for the Department of Labor 
tend to support this hypothesis. 
While extended duration in  the case of  temporary displacement  is 
certainly a social cost, extended duration for permanent layoffs need not 
be a social loss if it results in higher subsequent earnings or less employ- 
ment variability. The evidence for TAA recipients is mixed. Neumann 
and Glyde found a significant positive effect of  a higher wage replace- 
ment ratio on subsequent wage gains. Mathematica found no statistically 
significant increase in wages. However, using the Mathematica data, 
Richardson (1982a) found that the longer duration for TAA recipients 
may  have  increased the efficiency of  the initial search. His tentative 
conclusion (based on a relatively small sample of permanently displaced 
TAA recipients)  is  that TAA may  have  reduced  the incidence  and 
duration of  subsequent spells of  unemployment by improving the first 
match between workers and jobs after receipt of  TAA. The evidence 
from UI research is also mixed. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) found an 
earnings gain, while Classen (1977) did not. 
Overall, it appears unlikely that the current TAA  program has resulted 
in significant efficiency gains in terms of  promoting labor market adjust- 
ment to changes in trade. In large part this is because very few TAA 
beneficiaries were permanently displaced, at least until recently. There is 
some reason to believe that many of the auto workers currently receiving 
TAA are on permanent layoff and that they will use more of the adjust- 
ment assistance provisions of the program than earlier TAA recipients. 
The political rationale for the TAA program is that it is an important 
element of U.S. commercial policy. In the trade policy context, TAA  can 
be viewed as a “political buy-out”-it  both reduces opposition to free 
trade policies by lowering the adjustment costs of  the potential “losers” 
and provides  policymakers with  an attractive alternative option, in- 
termediate between protection and no import relief. Admittedly, the 
evidence to support this proposition is anecdotal: it is very difficult to 
know what policymakers would have done in the absence of the program. 
In an earlier paper (Ah0 and Bayard 1980) we presented some of  the 
evidence for the political gains from TAA, and these are reviewed here. 
It is probably not a coincidence that the 1962 and 1974 TAA programs 
were components of  legislation authorizing U.S. participation  in  the 
Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds of the MTN. Indeed, in the 1950s and early 
1960s labor leaders supported free trade policies and urged adoption of 
adjustment assistance programs to gain worker support for trade liber- 
alization. By 1970 most labor unions had shifted to a position opposing 
free trade and in support of legislation like the Burke-Hartke bill which 
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Bergsten (1972,703) has argued that one of the major administration 
motives for seeking legislative authority for U.S.  participation  in the 
Tokyo Round was the desire to preempt legislation like Burke-Hartke. 
The Trade Act of  1974 provided both the negotiating authority for the 
Tokyo Round and the provisions of the new TAA  program. In large part, 
the linking of TAA with the trade negotiations may have reflected the 
recognition that organized labor had the political power to impede, if not 
thwart, the negotiations. While many labor leaders were skeptical and 
sometimes hostile to TAA  by the 1970s (it was often described as “burial 
insurance”), by reducing the potential costs of trade liberalization, the 
expanded TAA  program embodied in the 1974 trade act may have served 
as a “sweetener” (as Robert Strauss, the U.S. Special Trade Representa- 
tive, used to call concessions to interest groups) to help reduce labor’s 
concerns about the negotiations. 
However, the causal linkage of TAA to the MTN does not necessarily 
imply that it was a quid pro quo for labor’s acquiescence to either US. 
participation in the Tokyo Round or the final trade package negotiated.’6 
At the time the MTN agreements were presented to Congress for ratifica- 
tion, legislation was also introduced (but never passed) to expand the 
TAA program.  Only at the time did labor insist that TAA was “an 
important adjunct  to the MTN package”  and that it represented  “a 
trade-off . . . for government action to further trade liberali~ation.’”~ 
It may be that the lack of explicit linkage in 1974 and the introduction 
of  that linkage by 1979 were tactical moves by labor to secure greater 
influence over both the actual trade negotiations and the scope of  the 
TAA program. Similar considerations may have led Kirkland (1981) to 
label the subsequent TAA budget cuts as “another broken promise to 
those who pay the price of  trade liberalization.” 
The strongest evidence that TAA played a role in the MTN is at best 
circumstantial: the surprising lack of labor opposition to passage of  the 
MTN package.  The Trade Agreements Act of  1979 implementing the 
Tokyo Round agreements was ratified by overwhelming votes of 395 to 7 
in the House and 90 to 4 in the Senate. However, the fragility of political 
support for freer trade, and the linkage between TAA  and a liberal trade 
policy, was noted by Representative Charles Vanik (former chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Trade) in arguing for an expanded TAA program: 
“Trade support on the Hill is fragile-there  are 100 members of Congress 
who don’t believe in trading with anybody. A majority in opposition to 
free trade can be achieved if  labor is alienated.” (Barrons, 5 May 1980). 
Table 5.4 provides a survey of  various estimates of  the welfare gains 
from the MTN. The estimates range from $130 to $900 million annually. 
These are static estimates. They do not include the potentially  large 
dynamic gains from freer trade. The estimates also pertain only to the 
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MTN. Most of  the negotiations involved codes of  conduct on nontariff 
measures. If  they are fully implemented and enforced, these codes could 
also result in significant welfare gains. Thus the total welfare gains from 
the Tokyo Round could be several times the estimates shown in table 5.4, 
and we would argue that at least some of these gains can be attributed to 
TAA  . 
The assumption in all of  this is that a liberal adjustment assistance 
program can be used to gain political support for liberal trade policies and 
did in fact play an important part in securing congressional support for 
the Tokyo Round agreements. Moreover, in the absence of  a program 
such as the Tokyo Round negotiations,  the United States might have 
taken two steps backward. Magee’s (1972) estimates, adjusted to 1979 
dollars, suggest that by 1980  the static welfare loss for the United States of 
reducing imports to their 1965-69 level, as the Burke-Hartke bill prop- 
osed, would have been $6-1 1 billion annually. Although this probably 
overstates the case, even trade restrictions in selected industries can have 
significant consumer and welfare costs when compared with the adminis- 
trative costs and the benefit levels of  the TAA program. 
Table 5.5  gives the welfare  and  consumer  cost estimates for  four 
industries where import relief (that is, increased protection) was recom- 
mended by the U.S. International Trade Commission or considered by 
the Carter administration (automobiles). Although the Trade Act of  1974 
also includes an escape clause (section 201) for import relief, the exist- 
ence of TAA provides the president and Congress with an intermediate 
option between increased import restrictions and no relief. In each of the 
four cases shown in table 5.5, the president rejected relief and recom- 
mended that expedited adjustment assistance be granted instead. 
Table 5.5  shows that even in one of  the smaller industries, leather 
wearing apparel, the estimates of the indefinite annual welfare loss of an 
additional 25 percent tariff ranged from $27 to $60 million, depending on 
the elasticity assumptions and the degree to which price increases are 
passed on to the consumer. More significantly for income redistribution, 
the estimated annual consumer costs were between $61 and $135 million. 
By comparison, if  the entire work force in the leather wearing apparel 
industry were made redundant and received 70 percent of  their former 
wage (say, 20 percent from TAA for the first 26 weeks and the entire 70 
percent for the next 26 weeks) for 52 weeks, benefits paid out under the 
TAA program would have been only about $21.5 million. 
In the more controversial case of automobiles, the annual welfare costs 
of  restricting  Japanese imports to  1979 levels  (a  reduction of  some 
250,000 units)  would range from  $43 to $55  million.‘8 The estimated 
consumer costs range from $1-2  billion annually. In announcing his 
decision not to provide import relief for the automobile industry, Presi- 
dent Carter noted that “between this fiscal year and the next, we are Table 5.4  Rough Orders of Magnitude of the Annual Static Welfare Gains from the Tariff Cuts Agreed to in the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations 
Study  Estimate  Assumptions  Comments 
1. BaldwiniMuttilRichardson"  $129 million  -30%  linear cut:  Based on tariff line detail. 
excludes textiles  Includes adjustment costs. 
-undiscounted  1979 dollars 
2.  Cline/Kawanabe/Kronsjo/Williamsb  $433 million  -30%  linear cut; 
excludes textiles 
-undiscounted  1979 dollars 
Basically the same as the 
Baldwin model. Excludes 
adjustment costs. 
3. Magee'  $770 million  -30%  linear cut; 
4eveloping countries included 
-textiles  and certain agricultural 
-undiscounted  1979 dollars 
Excludes adjustment costs. 
products excluded 4.  Stern/Deardorffd 
5. BayardiWipf‘ 
$710 million  -undiscounted  1976 dollars 
($905 million in 
1979 dollars) 
$20&500  million  -undiscounted  1976 dollars 
($225-638  million  -lower  est. assumes 
in 1979 dollars 
-uses  actual MTN tariff cuts 
fixed exchange rates; 
upper estimate assumes flexible 
rates. 
-uses  actual MTN tariff cuts. 
Based on tariff averages 
rather than tariff line detail. 
Excludes adjustment costs. 
Basically the Baldwin model. 
Based on tariff line detail. 
May overestimate gains because it 
fails to account for lost quota 
rents when tariffs are reduced. 
Excludes adjustment costs. 
NOTE:  None of  the estimates takes into account the impact of  growing trade volumes on the static annual welfare estimates. 
SOURCES: 
“Baldwin, R. E., J. H. Mutti, and J. D. Richardson, 1980. Welfare effects on the United States of  a significant multilateral tariff reduction. Journal of 
International Economics 10: 405-23. 
bW. R. Cline, N. Kawanabe, T. 0.  M. Kronsjo, and T. Williams, Trade Negotiations in the Tokyo Round, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1978. Figure presented was adjusted by Richardson (1979, pp. 11.7-10). 
‘S. P. Magee. “The Welfare Effects of Restrictions on U.S. Trade,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 3 (1972): 645-707.  Figure presented was 
adjusted by Richardson (1979, pp. 11.7-10). 
dR. M. Stern, and A. Deardorff, “An Economic Analysis of  the Effects of  the Tokyo Round of  the MTN,” report prepared for the Senate Finance 
Committee, June 1979, p. 64. 
“T. Bayard, and L. Wipf, “Trade, Employment, and Welfare Effects of  the Tokyo Round Tariff Cuts,” paper presented at the American Economic 
Association meetings, Atlanta, December 1979, p. 8. Table 5.5  Recent Cases Where the President Decided to Grant TAA Rather than Import Relief 
Estimated  Estimated  Number of 
Annual  Annual  Workers  Workers 
Case  cost  cost  Comments  for TAA  Industry“ 
Relief Requested  Consumer  Welfare  Certified  in the 
Autosb  Quota or OMA to  $1-2  billion‘  $4>55  million  (Not an escape clause [201] case)  267,236  900,700 
(Spring 1980)  restrict Japanese  In announcing his decision, the 
president noted that, “between 
this fiscal year and the next, we 
are budgeting over a billion dol- 
lars extra to provide trade 
adjustment assistance to tide the 
auto workers over until new jobs 
can be provided for them.” 
imports to 1979 
levels, probably 
cutting imports by 

















$61-135  million  $27-60 million 
$90-1,600  mil-  $2-140  million 
lion  (includes value- 
bracketed rents) 
$7.6 million  $4.8 million 
(201 case)  366  3,328 
(201 case)  69  44,620 
The president  noted that a large 
number of workers in the indus- 
try were eligible for and would 
receive TAA. 
(201 cases)  222  5,521 
"U.S.  International Trade Commission Reports on Section 201 of the Trade Act of  1974 cases. Employment data for automobiles are from unpublished 
Bureau of  Labor Statistics data for SIC 3711 and 3714. 
bThe consumer and welfare cost estimates for the 201 cases were pulled from interagency staff calculations and involve a variety of  methodologies and 
assumptions. The welfare estimates for autos are based on the Council of  Economic Advisors' assumptions and data. 
'Testimony of  George Eads of  the Council of Economic Advisors before the House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on 
Trade, 18 March 1980. 184  C. Michael AhoIThomas 0.  Bayard 
budgeting over a billion dollars extra to provide trade adjustment assist- 
ance to tide the auto workers over until new jobs can be provided for 
them.” To the extent that the existence of  the current TAA program 
makes it easier politically for the president to deny import relief, the 
program can generate significant welfare gains. 
Table 5.6 shows the administrative costs, payments to beneficiaries, 
and number of beneficiaries in the TAA program since it was liberalized 
in 1975. In comparing tables 5.4 and 5.6, the sum of administrative costs 
and payments to workers is clearly far less than the annual static welfare 
gains from the Tokyo Round tariff cuts alone, at least until 1980. The rise 
in TAA  payments in 1980  was the result of the enormous increase in TAA 
petitions from automobile workers.” 
On economic efficiency grounds (as opposed to budgetary considera- 
tions), it is not appropriate to compare the welfare gains for the nation as 
a whole with the  sum of  administrative costs plus beneficiary payments. It 
is more appropriate to compare these welfare gains with the administra- 
tive costs because they alone represent a net use of social resources. The 
TAA payments represent a transfer and therefore are not a social cost. 
5.4  Summary and Conclusions 
Any overall  evaluation  of  the TAA program must  necessarily be 
somewhat subjective. In our opinion  the political gains of  the TAA 
program, in the form of the welfare benefits of freer trade, are enormous. 
Whether these political gains outweigh the sum of  the administrative 
costs, induced labor market inefficiencies, and inequities of the program 
is more a matter of personal opinion than of professional judgment, given 
the difficulty of  evaluating many of  the costs of the program. Until the 
crisis in the auto industry caused a substantial rise in TAA  recipients and 
Table 5.6  Trade Adjustment Assistance under the Trade Act of  1974: 
Administrative Costs and Benefit Payments ($ millions) 
1975 






Administrative  Benefits 
costsa  Payments  Beneficiaries 
$2.0  $0.2  NA 
9.3  150.3  46,824 
11.5  147.9  137,960 
19.5  258.2  156,599 
18.2  265.0  131,722 
29.0  1,630.0  368,265 
~~ 
“Source: General Accounting Office, Restricting Trade Act Benefits Can Save Millions, 15 
January 1980, Washington,  D.C.: GPO; and recent budget estimates.  Includes federal 
offices and state employment offices’ administrative costs. 185  Trade Adjustment Assistance 
expenditures, the annual welfare gains from the MTN alone probably 
greatly exceeded the sum of TAA administrative costs and beneficiary 
payments. Taking these beneficiary payments as a maximum estimate of 
the costs of the program’s inequities and inefficiencies,  it still appears that 
there were substantial net benefits from the program, at least until 1980. 
The sharp increase in payments in 1980-81  focused the public’s and 
policymakers’ attention on the program. Although program costs were 
expected to fall dramatically by 1982,  as the auto industry began to adjust 
to import  competition and higher  oil prices,  the TAA program was 
restructured and several modifications were made to attempt to reduce 
the program’s inequities, inefficiencies, and costs. In particular, benefit 
levels were reduced to UI levels (roughly 50  percent of  the average 
weekly wage) and the combined duration of UI and TAA  can not exceed 
52 weeks, except for workers receiving training. In addition, the adminis- 
tration proposed a tightening of  TAA eligibility requirements so that 
imports must constitute “a substantial cause” of  worker displacement. 
Substantial cause means a cause that is important and not less important 
than any other cause. The substantial cause criterion is the same as that 
used for the escape clause for import relief. Congress initially agreed to 
tighten eligibility, but later decided to retain the original requirements. 
Cumulatively, these changes are likely to both lower TAA expendi- 
tures and redress some of  the program’s inequities and inefficiencies. 
However, given the trade-offs discussed in this paper, it is likely that 
these changes also will curtail the program’s political effectiveness in 
reducing the incidence and severity of  protectionism. 
The program is due to expire on 1  October 1983. In deciding whether to 
extend, modify, or terminate it, policymakers must weigh the somewhat 
elusive political benefits of  TAA against its more visible (but no less 
difficult to measure) equity and efficiency costs. It is likely that budgetary 
considerations also will continue to play a role in policy deliberations. We 
conclude with two observations that may help to focus the debate over 
TAA  . 
The first observation is that, no matter how well-designed the program 
is, there may always be fundamental trade-offs between the three basic 
objectives of TAA. Shifts in the program’s emphasis toward one objec- 
tive will often reduce its effectiveness in one or more of  its other func- 
tions. Much of the evolution of TAA since 1962 can be traced to shifts in 
policy objectives (Richardson 1982b). The original TAA program was 
primarily oriented toward equity and (to a lesser extent) efficiency con- 
siderations. The relaxation of eligibility criteria (first in 1970 and again in 
1974) and the increase in compensation levels reflected growing concern 
about political opposition to traditional free trade policy. The recent 
revisions lowering benefits were designed to redress perceived inequities 
and inefficiencies and to reduce expenditures. 186  C. Michael Aho/Thomas 0.  Bayard 
Although our purpose here is not to make detailed suggestions for 
program  reform,  three  general  principles  should  guide  any  further 
changes in the program’s emphasis. First, if the program is to be effective 
in reducing political resistance to U.S.  trade policy, and if it is to provide 
an alternative to protection, the criteria for eligibility should be weaker 
than those for import relief under the escape clause, and compensation 
should be somewhat more generous than UI benefits. Second, if  equity 
considerations are to be emphasized, the program should focus on the 
problems of permanently displaced workers, since they tend to suffer the 
largest losses. Third, if efficiency considerations dominate, the program 
should experiment with combinations of cash compensation and services 
to promote  adjustment,  and  the TAA component of  compensation 
should be at least partly experience rated to reduce disincentive effects. 
The second observation is that the program’s objectives and desirabil- 
ity should also be evaluated in the context of  prospective U.S. trade 
policy and problems in the 1980s. Earlier it was suggested that trade and 
trade-related adjustment problems will become increasingly important in 
this decade. The United States is also considering the possibility of new 
multilateral trade negotiations to stem the proliferation of  trade distor- 
tions both here and abroad. 
These considerations suggest the need to maintain the domestic politi- 
cal consensus in support of  free trade. As Martin Wolf  (1979, 7) has 
noted, “the key aim of any adjustment policy is to make acceptance of the 
particular change more politically feasible, and all alternatives have to be 
evaluated in this light.” If  the alternative to TAA  is increased protection- 
ism, the fundamental issue is whether TAA’s political contribution to 
American trade policy will be sufficient to justify its existence. 
Notes 
1. The TAA program established in the Trade Act of  1974 provided cash payments, 
training, employment services, and job search and relocation allowances to workers cer- 
tified by the secretary of  labor as having been laid off  or forced to work reduced  hours 
because of  imports. Cash payments are administered through state unemployment  com- 
pensation programs and, combined  with  state unemployment  compensation  payments, 
were equal to up to 70 percent of  the average wage in manufacturing.  Benefits were 
available for 52 weeks, with an additional 26 weeks available for workers who received 
training or  who were over 60years old. The  Trade Act of 1974  significantly eased the criteria 
for eligibility established under the Trade Expansion Act of  1962. The 1962 act stipulated 
that the  single most important cause of worker displacement had to be an increase in imports 
resulting from a tariff reduction. In contrast, under the 1974 act the connection between 
increased imports and a tariff reduction was completely severed and, in addition, imports 
need only have  “contributed importantly” to worker displacement, where “contributed 
importantly” is defined as a cause that is important but not necessarily more important than 187  Trade Adjustment Assistance 
any other cause. For a detailed discussion of  the history of TAA  in the United States, see 
Frank (1977) and Diebold (1972, 151-54).  Some of  the problems with the program were 
reported on the front pages of the Washington Post (9 April 1980) and the New York Times 
(21 April 1980). Major articles on TAA  also appeared in Barrons (5  May 1980), the National 
Journal (10 May 1980), and the Washington Post (10 February 1981). The program was 
modified in the Budget Reconciliation Act of  1981. These changes are discussed in section 
5.4. 
2.  Diamond  (1982)  points  out that  the government  might  want  to use  categorical 
programs to affect the income distribution because of economic and political limitations 
associated with progressive income taxation. Akerlof  (1978) has shown that categorical 
programs effecting a desired change in the income distribution may be more efficient than 
general programs because a categorical program will generally introduce smaller disincen- 
tive effects into the economy as a whole. 
3.  Corson et al. (1979, table 11-1, p. 17; table 11-2, p. 21). TAA  recipients tended to be 
somewhat older,  less educated,  and to have  longer  tenure than  UI recipients  in  the 
Mathematica survey. These differences are more pronounced when permanently displaced 
TAA  and UI recipients are compared. Of course, this begs the question of  whether current 
TAA recipients are necessarily representative  of  trade-displaced workers. 
4.  Corson et al. (1979, table VI-3, p. 143). However, permanently  displaced  TAA 
recipients tended to have somewhat greater losses than permanently  displaced UI reci- 
pients. 
5.  It should be recognized that some wageiprice rigidity is optimal in the sense that the 
transactions and information costs of  continuously adjusting wages and prices exceed the 
gains. In some cases, workers may be willing to accept some short-run  unemployment due to 
cyclical or  seasonal shifts in demand knowing that the probability of recall is high. In these 
cases,  neither firms nor workers  may  desire  to adjust  wages  or prices in response  to 
short-run fluctuations.  In these cases,  there is  no equity or efficiency basis for either 
compensation or adjustment services  because  the existing wage  structure presumably 
already compensates workers for the risk of  short-term unemployment. 
6. We owe this argument to Harry Gilman who pointed out to us that most of the cost of 
acquiring human capital is the income foregone while in training. The argument does not 
apply to expenditures on school tuition, etc., which are not depreciated under the tax laws 
unless they are used to improve existing skills or  are a requirement of the existing job. See 
also Becker (1975, 22-24)  and Boskin (1975). 
7.  Corson et al. (1979). Many of  the TAA recipients in  1979-82  in the automobile 
industry may be permanently displaced. The Mathematica survey found that 81 percent of 
TAA recipients expected to be recalled (vs. 73 percent of UI recipients in manufacturing) 
and that 72 percent were actually recalled (vs. 58 percent for UI recipients in manufactur- 
ing). Mathematica also found  that the earnings  losses of  permanently  displaced TAA 
recipients were somewhat higher than the losses of permanently displaced UI  recipients (see 
table VI-3, p. 143 in Corson et al. (1979). 
8.  Under the 1962 act, no workers were certified eligible for TAA  until 1969. Between 
1970 and 1974 about 47,000 workers received $69 million in benefits. See Bayard and Orr 
(1979) for a comparison of the 1962  and 1974TAA  programs. Bale’s (1973) study of  the 1962 
program was completed while the provisions of the new program were under discussion, but 
it is not clear that his report was considered by the drafters of the 1974 legislation. Bale’s 
study tended to support the notion that trade-displaced workers experienced high adjust- 
ment costs. See also Bale (1976). 
9. This discussion  ignores second-best  considerations.  Freer trade is assumed to be 
welfare improving, even though relaxing some distortions in the presence of others that are 
unchanged is not necessarily socially beneficial. Although some of  the calculations pre- 
sented in the next  section are made in a general equilibrium framework,  at best  they 188  C. Michael Aho/Thornas 0.  Bayard 
incorporate only the most readily quantifiable effects,  such as terms of trade changes under 
flexible exchange rates. 
10. An exception is Glenday, Jenkins, and Evans (1980) who adjust their calculations 
both for the value of  leisure and for the distortion in wages caused by trade restrictions. 
11. Several industries have supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) as part of their 
wage package. In some, like the auto industry, TAA payments are deducted from SUB if 
the layoff is temporary. In others, like the steel industry, TAA is in addition to SUB. 
12. The 1974 trade act stipulated that all TAA payments and administrative costs were 
to be funded out of customs revenues, but this provision was never implemented. Regard- 
less of  the source of  funding, if  TAA payments are incremental to other government 
expenditures and require a higher deficit or higher taxes, there are efficiency costs of raising 
the funds. 
13. A variety of  methodologies are used in the studies reported in table 5.2 to estimate 
earnings losses. Conceptually, the appropriate concept is “lifetime earnings losses” com- 
posed of the loss caused by the initial spell of  unemployment, the lifetime losses resulting 
from a loss of firm-specific  human capital and union rents, and losses from the instability of 
future employment because of the loss of seniority. See Jacobson and Thomason (1979) and 
Gilman (1979). The Mathematica (Corson et al. 1979) estimates are based on the losses 
incurred in the first three years after the initial layoff. 
14. The training and other adjustment provisions for TAA recipients were never fully 
funded.  Although the Trade Act of  1974 established a trust to be  funded from tariff 
revenues, it has never been implemented. In the past, training has been funded out of 
miscellaneous  funds, including  the secretary of labor’s discretionary  funds under Title I11 of 
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. With the increased demand for training 
during the fiscal year 1980, however, the $12 million allocated was exhausted during the first 
quarter. 
15. The criteria for eligibility under the 1962 act were quite stringent and no workers 
were certified for TAA until 1970. There is no clear connection with the shift in union 
attitudes, but in 1970 the eligibility criteria for TAA under the 1962 act were relaxed and 
47,000 workers eventually received benefits. 
16. Bayard and Orr (1982) hypothesized that actual receipt or a high probability of 
receipt of  TAA benefits during the MTN  negotiations (1975-79)  would have tended to 
reduce lobbying against tariff cuts. However, their preliminary results suggest no significant 
relationship between TAA expenditures and the tariff reductions. 
17. See Senate Committee of  Finance, Subcommittee  on International Trade, Hearings 
on the  Trade Adjustment Assbtance Act, 9 July 1979. 96th Congress, 1st  Session. The 
quotations are from the testimony of  John Sheehan, Legislative Director of  the United 
Steelworkers, pp. 84, 166. 
18. The welfare estimates do not include the quota rents that might accrue to Japanese 
exporters. If  these were included, the welfare costs could be $1-2 billion annually, given the 
Council of  Economic Advisors’ assumptions. In  May  1981 the  Japanese government 
announced a cutback of  auto exports of  140,000 units. Internal Department  of  Labor 
estimates are that the welfare costs could be as high as $220 million (depending on the 
beneficiaries of  the quota rents) in the first year of  export restraints. 
19. The budget overruns caused by the massive layoffs in the automobile industry gave 
impetus to a reappraisal of the costs and benefits of  the TAA program. In fiscal year 1980 
$381 million was budgeted for TAA compared with actual expenditures of $1,630 million. It 
can be argued that the budget overruns reflect a crisis in the industry rather than a major 
failure of  the program. 189  Trade Adjustment Assistance 
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COIllIlleIlt  J. David Richardson 
This is a fine survey and updating of  the U.S. experiment with Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) over the past twenty years. It does a great 
service by tabulating quantitative results from other studies on a compa- 
rable basis and by assessing often-neglected administrative costs of the 
TAA  program. Many sensible suggestions are given, some implicit, some 
explicit, for restructuring TAA to better meet its multiple goals. 
I have a few differences in emphasis. One is that I think the authors still 
sell short the benefits of the TAA experiment. For example, they recog- 
nize its political efficacy but do not sufficiently acknowledge its role as 
catalyst in the congressional passage of the Trade Expansion Act of  1962 
and the Trade Act of  1974. Since these laws led to the two deepest and 
most liberalizing rounds of  trade agreements in the postwar period, at 
least some of  the benefits from these agreements should properly be 
attributed to TAA. Or, while the authors acknowledge that TAA and its 
1974 revisions encouraged organized labor to support the Kennedy and 
Tokyo Rounds, they might have pointed out that it also encouraged 
“organized capital” to support these initiatives. TAA was viewed by 
many firms in 1962 as the quid pro quo for escape clause action. Also, 
while acknowledging TAA’s potential as a “diagnostic signal” for work- 
ers and firms to adjust, it is worth adding that it did so without itself 
distorting or weakening  any  of  the natural  market signals to adjust 
(prices, profits, market shares, etc.). Finally, I believe that the authors 
should give more than just one line to the way TAA encouraged growth 
in U.S. trade, especially with developing countries, by being a substitute 
for trade barriers that are all the more tempting to use against those 
without credible retaliation. 
To the  authors’ suggestions for  restructuring  TAA, I would  add: 
extension  of  existing  U.S.  employment  subsidy  programs,  such  as 
targeted job credits, to  workers certified as having been permanently (not 
temporarily) displaced by trade; self-financing  and voluntary loanhnsur- 
ance programs for the same kind of worker to underwrite retraining and 
perhaps relocating; and conditional extension of unemployment benefits 
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beyond normal for trade-displaced workers-conditional, for example, 
on employed workers and firms bearing some sizeable portion of  the 
extra financial burden through negotiated “cost sharing.” 
Otherwise I take issue with the authors in only one important matter. 
Most studies of TAA experience find that workers who are permanently 
displaced by trade suffer more severe adjustment problems and earnings 
losses than other permanently displaced workers. The authors consign a 
semblance of  that observation to their note 4, while saying in the text that 
“TAA recipients in general do not have higher earnings losses.” Yet the 
text’s conclusion characterizes only the study by Corson et al. (1979) and 
obviously reflects the high proportion  of  temporarily  displaced TAA 
recipients in that study. That conclusion does not do justice to earlier 
studies, nor to the legitimate equity goal of TAA. That goal may indeed 
have  been  perverted  in  the early  1980s, but  its usual legitimacy for 
permanently displaced workers has not been undermined as deeply as the 
authors suggest. 
Reference 
Corson, Walter, Walter Nicholson, J. David Richardson, and Andrea 
Vayda.  1979. Final  report:  Survey  of  Trade Adjustment Assistance 
Recipients.  Mathematica Policy Research for the Office of  Foreign 
Economic Affairs, Bureau of  International Labor Affairs, U.S. De- 
partment of  Labor. This Page Intentionally Left Blank